We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the well-known class of coalitional production economies, which covers exchange economies as a particular case. The key reason to use this class is the observation that the reduction of an exchange economy yields a production economy. q 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
Introduction
The consistency property in its several formulations has served to characterize Ž . most solution concepts in game theory. For example, Peleg and Tijs 1996 Ž . characterize the Nash equilibrium correspondence; Lensberg 1988 axiomatizes Ž . the Nash bargaining solution; Peleg 1985 Peleg , 1986 characterizes the core of NTU Ž . and TU games respectively; Hart and Mas-Colell 1989 van den Nouweland et al. 1996 for some specific class of generalized economies. In all these characterizations, the concept of consistency Ž . played a crucial role. In economies with a social endowment, Thomson 1988 and Ž . Thomson and Zhou 1993 show that the equal income Walrasian solution satisfies consistency. 1 Ž . Thomson 1995 gives the following informal description of consistency: ''A solution is consistent if whenever it recommends x as the solution outcome of some admissible problem, then it recommends the restriction of x to any subgroup as solution outcome of the 'reduced problem' faced by this subgroup: this is the problem obtained from the original one by attributing to the members of the complementary subgroup 'their components of x'. '' Of course, as is well-known, the definition of the 'reduced problem' is the key step. Roughly, one could distinguish two types of 'reduced problems' for a group Ž . of agents S. 1 One could imagine that those agents who are not in S left the scene with their components of x and further cooperation andror interaction with Ž . them is no longer possible. 2 Alternatively, one could envision that potential cooperation with agents not in S is used as an argument for bargaining among the agents in S. That is, it is as if the agents not in S have signed a contract under Ž . which they are willing to supply their resources if they are paid x. Instances of 1 can be found in bankruptcy, where the standard 'reduced problem' specifies the amount of the estate left to the members of S after the complementary group abandoned the room with the amounts allocated to them. This approach is also Ž . Ž . followed by Dagan 1994 and van den Nouweland et al. 1996 in their definition Ž . of a reduced generalized economy. Examples of 2 are the reduced games Ž . Ž . introduced by Davis and Maschler 1965 and by Hart and Mas-Colell 1989 . In these two reduced games, the worth of any subcoalition of S is defined taking into account the potential interactions with those agents who are not in S.
Ž . Following 2 , this paper uses consistency and converse consistency to characterize some of the central solution concepts in economics. We introduce several variations of a reduced economy, which differ in the way the interaction between the agents in the reduced economy and those that stayed outside is modeled. Using these different reduced economies and consistency, we are able to characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and a slight modification of the Walrasian correspondence, which we refer to as the Walras solution. 2 Our characterizations apply to very general classes of economies. In particular, our characterizations of the core and the Pareto correspondence work for the 1 For comprehensive surveys on consistency and its applications, the reader is referred to Thomson Ž . 1990 Thomson Ž . , 1995 2 This solution departs from the Walrasian correspondence in that it selects all the individually rational allocations in one-person economies and all shrunk core allocations in economies with more than one agent. For the relation between Walrasian and shrunk core allocations, see Debreu and Scarf Ž . 1963 . ( ) universal class of all economies, while that of the Walras solution does for the class of additive coalitional economies.
3 That is, our axiomatizations are not restricted to the class for which a given solution concept is non-empty. We regard Ž . these two issues axiomatic foundation and the problem of existence as unrelated. Ž . Our reduced economies are inspired by the characterizations of Dagan 1996 of core and shrunk core allocations. Moreover, the proofs of our results rely Ž . heavily on this work. Dagan 1996 makes it clear that both core and shrunk core Ž are expressions of agents' individual optimization for a suitably defined feasible . set with coalitions playing no crucial role. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ž one-agent reduced economies are central to our contribution in this sense, our Ž .. characterizations resemble the work of Peleg and Tijs 1996 .
The first reduced economy we study is based on the reduced game of Davis and Ž . Maschler 1965 . The situation it describes is as follows. Suppose an allocation x has been proposed to the economy. In order to define the reduced economy for a group S of agents, we assume that the feasible set for S contains all the bundles that can be produced by the grand coalition and which remain after the agents not Ž . in S are given bundles that they weakly prefer to x, i.e., S must cooperate with all the agents who are not in S. On the other hand, subcoalitions of S are allowed to imagine that they could cooperate in this fashion with any subset of agents outside S. When we use this reduced economy, we characterize the Pareto correspondence with the axioms of one-person rationality, consistency and converse consistency; likewise, the core is axiomatized with one-person rationality, individual rationality, consistency and a weakening of converse consistency.
4
One criticism usually raised against the D-M reduced game is that different subcoalitions may be using the resources of intersecting coalitions of agents outside S, thereby yielding feasibility problems. Countering this criticism, one can argue that the outside agents are used only to determine the relative bargaining power of the subcoalitions of S. Notice however that S itself can imagine this 'cooperation' with the outside agents without jeopardizing feasibility. Therefore, if one is willing to accept the logic of the D-M reduced economy for subcoalitions of S, there should be no problem accepting it for S itself. Our second reduced economy dispenses with the asymmetry of the Davis-Maschler reduced game. That is, in the reduced economy for S, the grand coalition is allowed to imagine the same kind of operations as its subcoalitions. When we use this reduced economy, the core obtains as the unique solution that satisfies one-person rationality, consistency and converse consistency.
3 Additive coalitional economies include pure exchange economies. 4 Ž . The axiomatizations of the core of games in coalitional form of Peleg 1985 Peleg , 1986 use the Davis-Maschler reduced game. They are given for classes of games with non-empty cores and the crucial reduced games are bilateral.
( )
Finally we pursue this 'cooperation' further. The third reduced economy we study allows its agents to cooperate a la DaÕis-Maschler infinitely-many times. That is, suppose that each agent's production possibility set in the original economy is given. Suppose an allocation x has been proposed and we need to define the reduced economy for S. Then, each agent in S can, as before, 'cooperate' with the agents not in S. But this is just a first iteration, i.e., each of them imagines that he has a larger production possibility set as a result of these trades. Now these new sets can be taken as the basis for new trades, which would lead to a second iteration of sets, and so on ad infinitum. That is, we could imagine that these agents are connected through a computer network. When a group of agents wants to cooperate, each of their computers calculates the respective agent's feasible set as a function of the resources of the other agents and sends back the result to the other computers. Using the new information, the computers can recalculate new feasible sets as a function of the updated resources of the other agents, and so on. The limit set is shown by the computer to the agent as this agent's feasible set of bundles. It is as if these agents were inevitably thirsty of profits and nothing would stop them from trying to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity. Of course, the problem is that these production sets exhibit infeasibilities almost everywhere: it may well be the case that the trade someone is offering me requires my own previous cooperation for a number of times. As Ž . Dagan 1996 shows, if the world were populated by this type of agents, the only allocations that could survive this insatiable thirst of profits are essentially the Walrasian ones. Moreover, the feasible sets that result from the iterative process described above are essentially budget sets generated by a common price vector. The axiomatic expression of this is our characterization of the Walras solution with one-person rationality, consistency and converse consistency by means of this reduced economy.
5
In sum, this paper characterizes some of the central solution concepts in economics by means of consistency and converse consistency. Consistency can be Ž interpreted as an axiom of 'equilibrium' in the sense of a self-consistent alloca-. tion-expectations property . Namely, it 'sustains' an allocation by providing an exact description of the expectations that agents and coalitions have if they were to 'deviate' and reject the allocation in question. Converse consistency, on the other hand, states that the solution can be 'decentralized' by being imposed on smaller groups, where each of them holds the appropriate expectations, as described by the relevant reduced economy. The uncovering of the expectations that underlie different solution concepts contributes to our better understanding of them.
To obtain our results, it is crucial to properly define the reduced economies. The key step in the construct is to realize that the reduction of an exchange 5 Ž . Other characterizations of the Walrasian correspondence are found in Gevers 1986 and Nagahisa Ž . 1991 . They are not consistency-based, however.
( )economy yields a production economy. Therefore, the natural class of economies to consider is the class of production economies which, unlike that of exchange economies, is closed under the reduction operation. Once this is understood, the Ž . rest follows essentially the approach taken by Peleg 1986 Peleg , 1985 in his characterizations of the core. If one wishes to remain within the class of exchange Ž . economies, one is led to consider generalized economies as in Dagan 1994 and Ž . in van den Nouweland et al. 1996 . These generalized economies, though, are invented to make a particular notion of consistency fit in. One additional advantage of our definition of reduced economies is that it yields 'pure' axiomatizations, in the sense that the class of economies to which they apply have nothing to do with the solution concepts characterized. This is in contrast to van den Nouweland Ž . et al. 1996 where the result holds for the class of generalized economies for which their solution concept is non-empty.
Another important feature of our characterization is that it does not rely on technical assumptions on the economy. In particular, we do not need to restrict attention to a class of economies with differentiable preferences. This is in contrast Ž . Ž . Ž . to Nagahisa 1991 , Dagan 1994 and van den Nouweland et al. 1996 . Our economies do not require even that agents' preferences be representable by utility functions. Another feature of the result, which is related to the previous point, is that when considering a closed class of economies in which the Walrasian allocations coincide with the shrunk core allocations, our characterization of the Walras solution in fact characterizes the competitive equilibrium allocations without making use of prices. In other words, prices are a consequence of the axioms and not an auctioneer's tool.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents basic notation and definitions. Section 3 analyzes the Davis-Maschler reduced economy and presents characterizations of the Pareto correspondence and the core. A slight modification of the Davis-Maschler reduced economy is presented in Section 4, where a simple Ž characterization of the core is given we choose to begin with the Davis-Maschler reduced economy for historical reasons. Readers interested in characterizations of . the core should perhaps skip Section 3 and read Section 4 first . Section 5 studies additive coalitional economies and characterizes the Walras solution.
Preliminaries

Notation
We denote by R l the l-dimensional Euclidean space. Given two non-empty
We shall denote by A y B the set A q yB . We also postulate that A q Ø s A. We denote by N the set of natural numbers.
is his reflexive preference relation over bundles in X ; and for each S : N, S / Ø, i Y : R l is the production possibilities set of coalition S.
S
Ž
. These economies were introduced in Boehm 1974 . They include private ownership economies as a particular case.
We refer to non-empty subsets S of N as coalitions, and to non-empty proper subsets S of N as proper coalitions. Let S be a coalition.
refer to N-allocations simply as allocations and we denote the set of allocations in
For every i g N and x g X , define the preferred and the weakly preferred sets i i as follows:
where % is i's strict preference relation and it is defined as usual.
i
Ž .
An allocation x
in E E is said to be improÕed upon by a coalition S if
An allocation in E E is said to be indiÕidually rational if it cannot be improved upon by any singleton coalition.
An allocation in E E is efficient if it cannot be improved upon by the grand coalition N.
An allocation in E E is said to be coalitionally rational if it cannot be improved upon by any coalition.
Let E be a class of economies. A solution on E is a set-valued function f that assigns to each economy E Eg E a set of allocations in E E.
Examples: Let E be the class of all economies. 0 1. The core C C, is the solution that assigns to each economy the set of its coalitionally rational allocations. 2. The Pareto optimal solution P PO O, assigns to each economy the set of its efficient allocations. 6 In fact, since all our arguments are purely set theoretic, we believe that all the results would go through if consumption and production sets were subsets of infinite dimensional spaces. Unlike the consideration of production economies, infinite dimensional spaces are not needed for the results and we choose our simpler formulation.
( )3. The individually rational solution I I R R, assigns to each economy the set of its individually rational allocations. 4. The empty solution assigns to each economy the empty set. 5. The Walrasian equilibrium solution W W E E assigns to each economy the set of all l Ä 4 allocations x for which there exists a price vector p g R _ 0 such that for
Two rather weak properties of solutions, which are expressions of the rationality of the agents, are: Ž . A solution f on a class E of economies satisfies one-person rationality OPR if it assigns to each one-person economy in E the set of its individually rational allocations.
Ž . A solution f on a class E of economies satisfies indiÕidual rationality IR if it assigns to each economy in E a subset of its individually rational allocations, i.e., Ž . Ž . f E E : I I R R E E for all E Eg E
The Davis-Maschler reduced economy
In this section we shall introduce our first type of reduced economy and define its related properties of consistency and converse consistency. We further use these properties to characterize the Pareto correspondence and the core.
be an allocation in E E and let S be a coalition. The reduced economy i ig N a-la-DaÕis-Maschler with respect to x and S is defined as follows:
In this reduced economy, the agents in S are committed to interact with all the agents in N _ S under the premise that each of them will receive a bundle which is not worse than their components of x. Therefore, the members of S are allowed only to redistribute among themselves bundles that are compatible with such a commitment. On the other hand, proper coalitions of S may choose any subset of N _ S in order to provide an argument to strengthen their bargaining position in the reduced economy. In other words, each of these coalitions imagines that they can leave the reduced economy and cooperate with some of the subsets of N _ S. The reader will recognize in this definition the spirit of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, applied to this setup. 
Consistency requires that if x is prescribed by f for an economy E E, then the projection of x to S should be prescribed by f for the reduced economy with respect to S and x for all coalitions S. Thus, the projection of x to S should be consistent with the expectations of the members of S as reflected by their reduced economy.
A solution f on a class E of economies satisfies DM-conÕerse consistency
be an economy in E, and let x be an efficient allocation in E E.
Converse consistency requires that if the projection of an efficient allocation x to every proper coalition S is consistent with the expectations of the members of S as reflected by their reduced economy then x itself should be recommended for the whole economy.
A solution f on a class E of economies satisfies weak conÕerse consistency
be an economy in E, and let x be an individually rational and
This is a weakening of the previous definition, since it requires that x be individually rational as well.
We state now our first result:
Theorem 1: A solution f on a closed class E satisfies OPR, DM-CONS and ( ( ) ( ) DM-COCONS if and only if
Proof: Let E be a closed class of economies. The reader can check that P PO O satisfies the three foregoing axioms. To prove the Theorem, we need to show the opposite implication. This will follow from the two lemmas below.
Lemma 1 Let f be a solution on a class E that satisfies OPR and DM-CONS.
( ) For all E Eg E, if x g f E E , then x is an efficient allocation in E E.
In fact, the careful reader will note that the above lemma holds with independence of the way the reduced economy is defined, as long as
. This fact will be used in the sections below. 
Proof
7 : We prove the Lemma by induction. By assumption, the claim is true for all one-person economies. Suppose next it holds for all k-person economies, with Ž . Ž . 1 F k F n y 1 and let E E be an n-person economy. Let x g w E E . By
is an efficient allocation. By DM-consistency of w,
Remark: Note again that this lemma holds with independence of the way in which the reduced economy is defined. Let now f be a solution on E that satisfies OPR, DM-CONS and DM-COCONS. Since both f and P PO O satisfy OPR, they coincide for all one-person economies. Further, since both satisfy DM-CONS and DM-COCONS, by Lemma 2, they must coincide for all economies.
The following examples show that the axioms used in the characterization are independent:
Example 1: The empty solution satisfies DM-CONS and DM-COCONS, but violates OPR.
Example 2: Let f be a solution on E defined as follows:
It can be easily checked that f satisfies OPR and DM-COCONS. Since f / P PO O, Ž by Theorem 1, it does not satisfy DM-CONS for a direct proof, choose a . non-efficient allocation in a two-person economy .
Example 3: It will be shown in Theorem 3 that the core on E satisfies OPR and Ž DM-CONS. Since C C/ P PO O, by Theorem 1, it does not satisfy DM-COCONS for a direct proof, choose an efficient allocation in a two-person economy which is not . individually rational . 7 This extremely powerful and simple lemma was shown to us by Stef Tijs.
( )The following definition shows an example of an abstract equilibrium. Abstract equilibria specify for each agent in the economy a bundle and a feasible set, and Ž . Ž . requires a that the bundles constitute an allocation in the economy, and b that each agent's bundle be maximal in the agent's preference ordering within the Ž . feasible set. See Dagan 1996 and the references therein for more details.
The special feature of the E-equilibrium as an abstract one is the 'recontracting' Ž . Ž . conditions ii . The following is a simple extension of Theorem 3 in Dagan 1996 . Ž We omit its proof. Dagan's result does not apply directly to our class of economies, but to exchange economies and to a class of production economies . different from the ones in this paper : 
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Next we use this theorem to obtain the following characterization.
Theorem 3: A solution f on a closed class E satisfies OPR, IR, DM-CONS and ( ( ) ( ) WCOCONS if and only if f s Core i.e., f E E s C C E E for eÕery economy ) E Eg E .
Proof: Let E be a closed class of economies. First we show that the core on E satisfies OPR, IR, DM-CONS and WCOCONS. It is well-known that the core satisfies OPR and IR.
To see that the core is DM-consistent, let E E be an economy in E and let Ž .
Ž . ²Ž . Ž . :
is an E-equilibrium where
Ž S, x . Let S : N be a coalition. We need to show that x g C C E E . By Theorem i ig S ²Ž . Ž S, x . : 2, it is enough to show that x , C is an E-equilibrium where
S, x Ž . Second, by definition of C , ii in the definition of an E-equilibrium is satisfied. 
Ž .
Condition iii follows from the lemma below:
, Y be an economy and let i g N.
Proof: Fix an agent i and let i g S : N.
S, x
a By definition of C ,
But this can be written as:
Since P x l C s Ø for all i g S and since by Lemma 3 C : C for all
S, x i g S, we have that P x l C s Ø, for all i g S. Since S was chosen arbitrar-
Ž . ily, this implies that iii is satisfied.
Next we show that the core satisfies WCOCONS. Let E E be an economy with at Ž . least two agents if it is a one-person economy, there is nothing to be proved , and Ž . let x be an individually rational and efficient allocation in E E. Assume that
Ž . : By Theorem 2, it is enough to show that x , C is an E-equilibrium 
Theorem 2, x , C is an E-equilibrium for E E . Hence, it must
Ž . which by Lemma 3 part b , is included in
Ž . By Eq. 4 and by individual rationality of the allocation x , the two i ig N components of this union are empty. Since S was chosen arbitrarily, this shows Ž . that iii is satisfied. Therefore, as claimed, the core satisfies WCOCONS.
To prove the Theorem, we need to show the opposite implication. This will follow from the next lemma.
Lemma 4: Let w be a solution on E that satisfies OPR, IR and DM-CONS, and let ( ) ( ) c be a solution on the same class that satisfies WCOCONS. If w E E : c E E for ( ) ( ) all one-person economies E E, then w E E : c E E for all economies E E in E.
Proof: We prove the Lemma by induction. By assumption, the claim is true for all one-person economies. Suppose next it holds for all k-person economies, with
Ž . 1 F k F n y 1 and let E E be an n-person economy. Let x g w E E . By
is an individually rational allocation. By
Let now f be a solution on E that satisfies OPR, IR, CONS and WCOCONS. Since both f and C C satisfy OPR, they coincide for all one-person economies. Further, since both satisfy IR, DM-CONS and WCOCONS, by Lemma 4, they must coincide for all economies. I The following examples show that the axioms used in the characterization are independent:
Example 4: The empty solution satisfies IR, DM-CONS and WCOCONS, but violates OPR.
Example 5: The P PO O solution satisfies OPR, DM-CONS and WCOCONS, but violates IR.
Example 6: The I I R R solution satisfies OPR, IR and WCOCONS. Since I I R R/ C C, Ž by Theorem 3, it violates DM-CONS for a direct proof, choose an individually . rational but non-efficient allocation in a two-person economy .
Example 7: Consider the class E of economies with strictly monotone prefer-M Ž . ences which is closed . Let f be a solution on E defined as follows:
It can be checked that f satisfies OPR, IR and DM-CONS, but does not satisfy WCOCONS.
Remark: Theorem 3 is related to the characterization of the NTU core by Peleg Ž . 1985 . There are some important differences, however. First, Peleg's result holds for either a variable number of agents or for a finite set of agents of cardinality larger than 2. Our result, on the other hand, does not impose such restrictions. Second, while Peleg's result applies to a specific closed class of games, that where the core is non-empty, ours holds for any closed class of economies. In particular, it holds for the class of all economies. Consequently, our characterization yields Ž . the empty set when the core is empty. In addition, Peleg 1985 also requires non-emptiness of the solution as an axiom. In contrast, we do not require this: we believe that the axioms behind a solution should stay with it even when the solution is empty. Third, unlike Peleg's, our result does not require any technical assumption on the economy. In particular, individuals' preferences need not have a ( )numerical representation. Having said all this, we should make it clear that the roots of our result are found in Peleg's.
An alternative reduced economy
This section modifies the reduced economy used earlier and presents consistency and converse consistency accordingly. These new axioms are then utilized to provide an alternative characterization of the core.
x s x be an allocation in E E and let S be a coalition. The DM -reduced i ig N economy with respect to x and S is defined as follows:
The only difference between this and the D-M reduced economy is the fact that the coalition S is also allowed to imagine potential interaction with any of the subsets of N _ S. In other words, they are not required to cooperate with all the members of N _ S. Note that the usual criticism to the D-M reduced economy-i.e., the fact that two coalitions may imagine mutually incompatible interactions-does not apply to S. The definition of a closed class of economies given in Section 2 applies to this kind of reduced economies as well.
The interpretations of the above two properties are similar to those given in Section 3. Our next characterization result follows.
Theorem 4: A solution f on a closed class E satisfies OPR, DM
X -CONS and
Proof: Let E be a closed class of economies. First we show that the core on E satisfies OPR, DM X -CONS and DM X -COCONS. It is easy to see that the core satisfies OPR. To see that the core is DM X -consistent, let E E be an economy in E and let Ž .
Ž S, x . Let S : N be a coalition. We need to show that x g C C E E . By Theorem
Condition iii follows from the following lemma:
By definition of Y S, x , the production possibilities set of F in the reduced F economy with respect to S and x, the latter expression equals
Next we show that the core satisfies DM X -COCONS. Let E E be an economy Ž with at least two agents if it is a one-person economy, there is nothing to be . Ž . proved , and let x be an efficient allocation in E E. Assume that for all
Ž . : Theorem 2, it is enough to show that x , C is an E-equilibrium for
Ž . Condition i is satisfied by assumption. By definition of C , condition ii is i immediately satisfied as well. Let S : N, S / Ø, be a proper coalition. By
S, x assumption and by Theorem 2, x , C is an E-equilibrium for E E .
S, x
Hence, it must satisfy iii , that is, P x l C s Ø for all i g S. But by Lemma
Ž . 5, this amounts to, P x l C s Ø for all i g S. Since S was chosen arbitrarily,
X this shows that iii is satisfied. Therefore, as claimed, the core satisfies DM -COCONS.
To prove the Theorem, we need to show the opposite implication. This will follow from the next two lemmas. Proof: It is analogous to that of Lemma 2 after taking into account its subsequent remark.
I Let now f be a solution on E that satisfies OPR, DM X -CONS and DM X -COCONS. Since both f and C C satisfy OPR, they coincide for all one-person economies. Further, since both satisfy DM X -CONS and DM X -COCONS, by Lemma 7, they must coincide for all economies. I To demonstrate that the axioms used in the characterization are independent, consider the following examples.
Example 8: The empty solution satisfies DM X -CONS and DM X -COCONS, but does not satisfy OPR.
Example 9: Consider again the closed class E of economies with strictly M monotone preferences. Let f be defined on this class as follows:
if E E is a one y person economy.
Ž .
It is easy to see that f satisfies OPR and DM X -CONS. By Theorem 4, it cannot satisfy DM X -COCONS because f / C C.
Example 10: It is easy to see that P PO O satisfies OPR and DM X -COCONS. By X Ž Theorem 4, it cannot satisfy DM -CONS because P PO O/ C C. For a direct proof, take an efficient allocation in a three-person economy which is improved upon by . a two-person coalition S and consider their corresponding reduced economy . 
Additive coalitional economies and the Walras solution
We now introduce a new modification of the reduced economy and explore its associated properties of consistency and converse consistency. They are then used to characterize the Walras solution on an interesting subclass of economies.
Since for an additive economy, in order to know the
production possibilities of a coalition it is enough to know the production possibilities of each of its individual members, in this section we abuse notation ² Ž . : slightly and denote a typical economy by E Es N, X , K , Y .
Denote by E the class of all additive economies. For an additive economy we 1 Ä can define its replica economies as follows. For every m g N, let m s 1, 2, . . . ,
be an economy in E and let x s x be
, where for all i, j g N = m, X s X , K sK ,
An allocation x is a shrunk core allocation if x m is a core allocation of E E m ; m g N.
Examples of solutions on E 1
The solutions C C, I I R R, P PO O and the empty solution on E are defined in a 1 Ž . similar way as they were defined in Section 2. 1 The shrunk core S S C C assigns to Ž . each additive economy the set of all its shrunk core allocations. 2 The Walras Ž . Ž . solution W W assigns to each one-person economy E E the set W W E E s I I R R E E and Ž . to each economy E E with at least two agents the set W W E E of all its shrunk core allocations.
be an economy. Let x s x be an
allocation in E E and let Q : N be a coalition. For any i g Q define inductively:
Ž . 
an allocation in E E and let S be a coalition. The DM`-reduced economy with respect to x and S is defined as follows:
.
The main difference between this reduced economy and that of Section 4 is the concept of 'cooperation.' When calculating the initial resources of an agent i in the reduced economy with respect to S and x, agent i is allowed to 'cooperate' with members of N _ S, where 'cooperating' has the interpretation we gave above.
be an economy, and let
The following abstract equilibrium notion will be useful in our next axiomatization.
Note that an E-equilibrium and a W-equilibrium differ in the recontracting conditions on the feasible sets.
i i
Based on Theorem 5, we can prove our final result: Pick an agent j g S. The last expression can be rearranged to get:
which is included in Proof: It is analogous to that of Lemma 2 and is left to the reader. I Let now f be a solution on E that satisfies OPR, DM`-CONS and DM`-1 COCONS. Since both f and W W satisfy OPR, they coincide for all one-person economies. Further, since both satisfy DM`-CONS and DM`-COCONS, by Lemma 9, they must coincide for all economies. I To demonstrate that the axioms used in the characterization are independent, consider the following examples.
Example 11: The empty solution satisfies DM`-CONS and DM`-COCONS, but does not satisfy OPR.
Example 12: Let f be a solution on the class of all additive economies defined as follows:
I I R R E E
if E E is a one y person economy
Ž .
f E E s Ž . ½ Ø otherwise.
( )It is easy to see that f satisfies OPR and DM`-CONS. By Theorem 6, it cannot satisfy DM`-COCONS because f / W W .
Example 13: It is easy to see that P PO O satisfies OPR and DM`-COCONS. By Theorem 4, it cannot satisfy DM`-CONS because P PO O/ W W .
